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Abstract 
This essay is aimed at building a bridge between two female writers very 
distant in time and place, Margaret Cavendish and Siri Hustvedt, on three basis: 
that of a work they have in common – which Hustvedt has almost rewritten 
from Cavendish, The Blazing World –, two of their proto-feminist and feminist 
tactics to overcome the boundaries posed by patriarchy – that of embodiment 
and that of masquerade –. and their consideration of imagination – as a 
fundamental means of knowledge.  
Though one of the peculiarities of 17th century paradigm shift was the 
distinction of the scientific discourse from the religious, magic, mystic and 
artistic one, yet a link still seems to remain between science and imagination, as 
demonstrated, for instance, by Galileo’s aesthetic attitude (Panofsky), by 
Hooke’s and Baker’s imaginative suggestion before their microscopes (Hooke; 
Baker; Nicholson), Bacon’s duplicity as «the enthusiast of both power of 
imagination and understanding and as the harbinger of narrow objectivism and 
the dissociation of sensibility» (Levao: 5; Bacon). However the idea of 
imagination as a true means of knowledge seems to be a merely female 
intuition, or rather a subversive way to shift the scientific paradigm once again, 
replacing objective and disembodied observation with subjective imagination 
and speculation. This is the main subject of Margaret Cavendish’s best known 




work, The Blazing World (1666), where her alter ego is free to build a whole social 
and philosophical system based on corporality and subjectivity. 
From the same conception of imagination does Siri Hustvedt start when in 
2014 she rewrites The Blazing World: the story of an artist who, in the twentieth 
century, still tries to face the overwhelming misogyny with the performance of 
the body and the theory of embodiment. The protagonist is really close to the 
Duchess of Newcastle, especially for her desire to overturn the artificial gender 
categories through a real masquerade. The voices of Cavendish, Hustvedt and 
of all their alter egos follow each other through documents, diary pages and 




Siri Hustvedt, Margaret Cavendish, experimental philosophy, 
neuroscience, masquerade 
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The most recent discoveries deriving from the exchanges between 
aesthetics and neuroscience – especially those stressing the importance 
of the sensory-motor system in both scientific and aesthetic experience 
(Gallese 2005; 2011; 2017; 2018; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) – have raised 
a particular attention on the subjectivity of mental processes, especially 
those related to the knowledge processes, and on the role of imagination. 
Experimental aesthetics is a new way of approaching aesthetic issues, 
such as those of images or novels as media of experience, by means of 
neuroscientific investigations. Nowadays the work of neuroscience 
applied to aesthetics has largely demonstrated how both thought and 
physical experience are rooted in the same brain-body system, activating 
what Vittorio Gallese et al. call “embodied simulation”, that is «a pre-
rational, non introspective process generating a physical, and not simply 
“mental”, experience of the mind, motor intentions, emotions, 
sensations, and lived experiences of other people, even when narrated» 
(Gallese 2011 et all.). Embodied simulation is strictly connected to the 
notions of inter-subjectivity and inter-corporality («the mutual 
resonance of intentionally meaningful sensory motor behaviour» 
Gallese 2017), by which we can understand other people (real or fictional 
ones) thanks to the “motor equivalence” between what they do and 
what we (could) do. Not only does embodied simulation connect us to 
other people, but also to objects (either man-made or natural), allowing 
them to attribute relational qualities to the potentialities of our body. 




Furthermore, much of our everyday life is characterized by the 
experience of objects, people, actions and worlds which are not real, or 
which are not real yet. As for the real life, the life looked at on paintings, 
photographs, screens, it activates quite the same re-actions by our 
sensory-motor system. Actually, it activates major and more intense re-
actions since, being our body not involved in any other “real” physical 
activity, all our energies are focused on this experience. This is the 
“liberated embodied simulation”: «Through an immersive state in 
which our attention is focused on the fictional world, we can fully 
deploy our simulative resources, letting our defensive guard against 
daily reality slip for a while» (Gallese 2017). 
The embodied simulation is strictly linked to physiological vision, 
cultural gaze and their functioning. It is a particular kind of vision and 
gaze, completely different from the one theorized by 17th century 
natural philosophy – an objective, disembodied, omniscient, even 
imperialistic gaze. However, an attempt to recover the corporeality (not 
only) of the vision and its intrinsic intersubjectivity had already been 
made, in the twentieth century, by the phenomenological philosophy, of 
course starting with Husserl1, but especially by Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and Edith Stein. Maurice Merleau-Ponty lowered the gaze into a terrain 
completely different from the Cartesian one: no longer as a mechanism 
of objectification that exists only at a perceptual level, but as an 
intersubjective relationship. The fundamental characteristic of this 
model of gaze is its embodiment, it is the carnality of perception, which 
is translated into a chiasmus between visible and invisible. The gaze 
which Merleau-Ponty refers to is not a scientific gaze, the gaze from 
above, the imposed gaze that distances the subject from the object in a 
hierarchical situation. The flesh itself, neither completely opaque nor 
 
1 Starting from Husserl’s distinctions among different senses of the living 
body, other phenomenologists like Lévinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir 
focused on different characteristics of embodiment in inter-personal relations, 
such as affective and erotic relations, and specifically, respectively, generativ-
ity and caress, love, desire, hate, indifference, sexuality and sexual desire, sex-
ual ambivalence. 
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completely transparent, is the place of exchange between the visible and 
the invisible. It is the place where the only punctum caecum is given: the 
subject, his or her corporality, is the means by which the world becomes 
visible, but it is simultaneously what remains invisible to the subject 
him- or herself (Merleau-Ponty 1964; Cammarata). 
The inter-subjectivity and the corporeal realization of human 
vision, as well as of the other senses and means of perception, opens up 
a brand-new series of turns in western traditional oppositions: 
mind/body; culture/nature2; and, moreover, objective and subjective3. In 
this perspective (human) body is no longer seen as a material thing but 
the first fundamental means by which all living beings relate to the 
world and its object. At the same time human mind is not an abstract, 
pure, spiritual, disembodied matter, but a part of our body, which 
expresses itself precisely through the body, bodily gestures, and the 
 
2 Once the traditional opposition of culture and nature has been broken 
down, culture is not conceived anymore as a system of significations and pro-
ductions, but as a system of generative life, grounded in the own mortality of 
bodies; on the other hand, nature is not the traditional passive object of the 
scientific imperialistic gaze, but the common field in which all living beings 
move, perceive and act through their bodies. 
3 One of the most interesting results of the dismantling of traditional po-
larities is the crisis of "binary economics”, a fundamental turn especially for 
1960-1970’s French feminism, of which the most representative is Luce Iri-
garay. Irigaray has had the merit of identifying, in a binary economy made up 
of a rigid pattern of polar oppositions, an interpretative model that not only 
describes the patriarchal structure, but signals its traps and indicates the ways 
out. In the scheme that opposes - among others - man to woman, the feminist 
discourse will never find a space for its own voice, the mother's voice, not even 
positioning itself in the space opposite to its traditional pole, that of the father. 
The only way out is to stand on the sidelines, out of the scheme, breaking the 
rigid oppositional structures, refusing the domestication of the binary econ-
omy and the specularity that derives from it. “Precisely because the Mother, 
to whom Irigaray gives word, has been removed from the stereotypes of the 
binary economy, she herself allows a thematization of the body and of Eros 
which subverts the phallogocentric imagination”, (Cavarero, Restaino: 103). 




whole corporal phenomena. Thus, we have now to talk about 
“embodied minds” or “mental bodies”. In the same way nature cannot 
be seen any longer as the object of physical sciences gaze, but as the 
common field in which we all together perceive, move and act through 
our bodies; and culture is not only a system of significations and 
productions, but a system producing forms of life grounded in the body, 
even in its mortality (Husserl 1988: 140-182). 
 
These results have, still nowadays, influence and confirmation in 
literature, which many scholars interested in a cognitivistic approach 
consider as related, if not just the same, to the ability of mankind to make 
tools and, thus, to make sense (Stout, Chaminade 2009). 
An example of this reciprocal influence of neuroscience and 
literature is without a doubt the work of Siri Hustvedt, a writer who 
constantly tests her scientific studies by means of literature. Indeed, 
being both an  essayist (see works such as Three Emotional Stories: 
Reflections on Memory, the Imagination, Narrative, and the Self, 2011, Living, 
Thinking, Looking, 2011, A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women: 
Essays on Art, Sex, and the Mind, 2016, and the most recent The Delusions 
of Certainty, 2018) and a novelist (Memories of the Future, 2019, The 
Summer Without Men, 2011, The Shaking Woman or a History of My Nerves, 
2010, and The Blazing World, 2014 that we will analyze further) she 
perceives literature not as an illustration, an ornament, or a means of 
dissemination, rather as «the form in which this research can be given, 
since the destinies of the investigation on the mind and on the Self can’t 
be given but in a narrative form, this being what contributes to their 
formation» (Cometa 2019). As we will see shortly, Siri Hustvedt’s way 
of writing is very close to that of  the 17th century writer and natural 
philosopher, Margaret Cavendish, not only because of the use of 
literature as a form of scientific investigation, but also because of the 
very style of writing, constantly enriched by autobiographical and 
metaliterary inventions, and of a deep conceiving of the corporeal, 
embodied form of literature. Thus, there seems to be a bridge linking 
Hustvedt’s experimental aesthetics and Cavendish’s experimental 
philosophy. 
Between, vol. IX, n. 18 (Novembre/November 2019) 
5 
Experimental philosophy, born in the mid-17th century, was the 
reaction of the “new science” against the old natural philosophy, i.e. that 
kind of philosophy trying to reach knowledge about nature and 
humankind only through speculative reasoning. In this approach 
experiments and observations had the only aim of demonstrating what 
was already established by reason. With the spreading of new and better 
optical devices and, moreover, with the raising of scientific societies, this 
approach shifted to a more consistent consideration of observation and 
of the usefulness of the senses, first of all that of sight. However, the 
consideration of the sight as a not “too much corporeal” sense, much 
closer to the mind than to the body, and the support offered to this sense 
by mechanical devices (such as the microscope and the telescope), 
produced a specific kind of observation which was supposed to be 
impersonal and the led the supposed objectivity of science (Schaffer, 
Cammarata). Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, is a major 
example of active participation in the scientific discussion of her age. In 
1666, a year after the publication of Sir Robert Hooke’s Micrographia, a 
member emeritus of the Royal Society, the Duchess published a treatise 
entitled Observations on Experimental Philosophy, opposed to the theories 
of the Royal Society and contesting them. 
What she contested to male experimental philosophy is the 
assumed objectivity of science (which side a part the role of the 
subjective body), the belief in a mechanical vision (better than the 
physical one) and the surrender of imagination. Cavendish was 
particularly sensible to the fascination of imagination, or as she said 
fancy, considering it as a full means not only of knowledge, but properly 
of perception, the unmediated perception she was looking for. If, as she 
has already argued, human beings see not only with physical eyes but 
also with the mind, then there is a link between imagination and reason, 
a link women are much acquainted with. This internalization of 
knowledge and perception makes vision work in two different ways, 
according to Cavendish’s Natural Philosophy: first, the objects of vision 
are projected onto an internal and personal world; second, the external 
world is known through the internal, spiritual and imaginative 
properties of the subject. Thus imagination, that is the skill of seeing 




what is not already seen, is a means of knowledge as much as 
observation is. Indeed, senses are limited and cannot lead us to a broader 
knowledge, while imagination makes us discover what might exist 
beyond these limits. Imagination is not considered as a free movement 
of the mind. It, belonging to the same brain material, is not fantastic and 
needs to be educated both with Natural Philosophy and Poetry, the first 
leading its orientation to significant forms, the second making form and 
beauty recognizable. 
In the last two decades, the work of Siri Hustvedt, both as a writer 
and as a neuroscientific researcher, has built a bridge to the work and 
thought of Margaret Cavendish, as definitely demonstrated by her 
complex novel The Blazing World, a sort of recovery and rediscovery of 
the fancy written by the Duchess in 1666 as an appendix to her 
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. Siri Hustvedt’s attempt is that 
of posing the difficulties of women to find their right place as artists (but 
also as writers and scientists) in the 21st century. Little has changed since 
the 17th century, when Margaret Cavendish was considered “Mad 
Madge”4. Hustvedt links her work to that of Cavendish also in 
considering the role of embodied experience and of imagination, and in 
the vindication of a feminist issue in the cultural and social structure of 
science (like other authors – such as Donna Haraway, Evelin Fox Keller, 
Lorraine Daston – have been doing in the last few years)5. 
Margaret Cavendish and Siri Hustvedt have, in particular, three 
main focuses, which orient the whole structure of their works: a work 
written by Cavendish in 1666 and re-written by Hustvedt in 2014; a 
 
4 Katie Whitaker, Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, 
Duchess of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen, New York, Basic 
Books, 2002. 
5 See for instance, Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges. The Science Ques-
tion in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, in Muriel Lederman, In-
grid Bartsch (by), The Gender and Science Reader, London-New York, Routledge, 
2001; Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven-London, 
Yale University Press, 1985; Lorraine Daston, Peter Galison, Objectivity, New 
York - Cambridge, MASS, MIT Press, 2007. 
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precise female strategy to speak as a subject in a deeply male chauvinist 
world: the masquerade; the search for a feminine specificity, and its 
claim in a subjective, corporeal or embodied form. 
 
Rewriting The Blazing Worlds 
Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World was first published in 1666 
and then in 1688 as an appendix to the Observations upon Experimental 
Philosophy. 
The novel tells the story of a young woman, involved in a 
shipwreck, who found herself lost on an island, in another dimension6. 
As often happens in this genre, the new world is a mirror of the 'old' one 
and it allows the main character and the writer herself (who often 
coincide) to reflect on the limits of contemporary society, on the progress 
that can be achieved and the best way to achieve it. This is exactly what 
happens to the woman who, well received in the “blazing world”, soon 
becomes the empress. The first difference from the 'real' society lies in 
the almost absolute equality of the sexes. As empress, the protagonist 
immediately devotes herself to an in-depth study of the social, political 
and, above all, cultural aspects of her kingdom and soon decides to 
found a philosophical method of her own, with the support, however, 
of a mind that is equal and congenial to hers. The wise philosopher of 
the blazing world suggests her not to ask Gassendi, Kepler or Galilei, 
but rather a humbler but still lively soul like that of the Duchess of 
Newcastle herself. Thus, the author enters, in the second degree, the 
story by showing a multiplication of personalities that she had already 
 
6 The story is written on the model of the Travels to other worlds, a very 
popular genre in that century and the next, after the Entretiens sur la pluralité 
des mondes by Fontenelle, the novels by Wilkins (The Discovery of A World in 
The Moone, first published in London in 1638), Godwin (The Man in the Moone 
or A Discourse of a Voyage Thither by Domingo Gonsales, 1638), Cyrano de Berge-
rac (A Discourse of The World in The Moon) and the rediscovery of Lucian and 
his famous work Icaromenippus, The Man in the Moon. 




staged in the Sociable Letters. In the Epilogue to the Reader, the author 
explains how to interpret the whole fancy, making explicit what we have 
already argued: 
 
By this Poetical Description, you may perceive, that my ambition 
is not only to be Empress, but Authoress of a whole World; and that 
the Worlds I have made, both the Blazing- and the other Philosophical 
World, mentioned in the first part of this description, are framed 
and composed of the most pure, that is, the rational parts of matter, 
which are the parts of my mind. (Cavendish 1994) 
  
Hustvedt's Blazing World was published in 2014. If the genre chosen 
by Cavendish is the utopian one, that chosen by Hustvedt is more 
difficult to define. We could trace it back to the genre of the biofiction, i. 
e., with the definition of Alexandre Gefen, a literary fiction in 
biographical form, in this case the life of an imaginary character. But is 
this character really imaginary? Or is she an alter ego of the author? In 
this case we should talk of autofiction. 
Harry, diminutive of Harriette Burden is the protagonist of the 
novel, whose life is told or, rather, collected by another alter ego of the 
author’s, something more and different than a narrator, IV Hesse, whose 
voice rarely intervenes in the text. In the introduction, in the first person, 
he (or she?) tells us of the motivations and structure of the work only 
after citing the most explanatory aphorism of the personality of the 
protagonist: 
 
All intellectual and artistic endeavors, even jokes, ironies, and 
parodies, fare better in the mind of the crowd when the crowd 
knows that somewhere behind the great work or the great spoof it 
can locate a cock and a pair of balls. (Hustvedt 2014: 1) 
 
These are the words of Burden taken from an article published 
under the pseudonym Richard Brickman, in the academic journal "The 
Open Eye", with the intention of revealing the plan behind her project 
(perhaps the real protagonist of the novel) entitled Maskings, stating that 
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it was meant not only to expose the antifemale bias of the art 
world, but to uncover the complex workings of human perception 
and how unconscious ideas about gender, race, and celebrity 
influence a viewer’s understanding of a given work of art. (ibid.) 
 
To stage this project Burden had hired three male artists who 
(between 1998 and 2003) had to pretend to be the authors of three of her 
works: Anton Tish for The History of Western Art, Phineas Q. Elridge for 
The Suffocation Rooms, Runes for Beneath. The experiment would have 
shown not only that the three works presented by males would have 
had a greater impact than if she had been considered the author, she, the 
artist who had never acquired any degree of celebrity and recognition 
except for being the wife of Félix Lord, a smart and very rich art dealer 
and discoverer of talents, but it also would have shown that the three 
accomplices had only been "disguises" hiding the identity of the author. 
Neither her identity nor that of the disguises had remained untouched, 
each of them confused with that of the author, and hers with theirs, and 
all of them together, creating a true hybrid, a 'hermaphrodite self'. And 
this applies not only to artistic creation, but also to the 'real' lives of the 
individuals involved who will come out of this experience completely 
distorted: Tish is unable to recognize his work, Runes and Burden 
herself are involved in an undecidable plagiarism case, Elridge is now 
freed in his homosexuality but also by the performative creativity that 
had distinguished him before the experiment. The story unfolds through 
a multi-line and choral narration, through Harry's first-person 
narratives, in the notebooks found during Hesse's 'academic' research, 
and the testimonies of those who had been close to her, Tish and Elridge, 
her daughter Masie and his son Ethan, her partner Bruno Kleinfeld, the 
faithful friend (and psychoanalyst) Rachel Briefmann, as well as some of 
the young penniless artists that Harry hosted in her Red Hook 




workshop7. The narration, or rather the narrations, follow each other 
rather confusedly with a wealth of details that brings us back to the (non-
diegetic) reality of New York art scene from the 70’s to 2003. It goes by 
with a continuous cross-reference between the levels of reality from 
which occasionally even the hidden author, Siri Hustvedt herself, 
emerges. Harry presents her as «an obscure novelist and essayist, Siri 
Hustvedt, whose position Burden calls 'a moving target'» (Hustvedt 
2014: 272). She introduces Margaret Cavendish as well. Her biography 
is constantly reported by Burden – who calls her a mother but also an 
alter ego and a sister –, and by all the other members of her circle – 
informed in various ways about the life of the duchess by Harry herself. 
Finally, the Duchess is 'embodied' in Burden’s masterpiece, the almost 
completed but never presented one, which should have been Harriette 
Burden's debut with an uncovered face: 
 
Harry returned to her Margaret, her Blazing World Mother 
creature she had begun much earlier and had nearly finished […] 
This woman had worlds inside her. When you looked up and into 
her bald, see-through cranium, you saw little people, hordes of 
busy wax Lilliputians going about their business. They ran and 
jumped. They danced and sang. They sat at miniature desks facing 
computers, typewriters, or pages. When you looked closely, you 
could see they were making musical scores, drawings, 
mathematical formulas, poems, and stories […] There were seven 
lascivious couples going at it upstairs in the female Gulliver’s 
head—men and women, men and men, women and women—a 
regular orgy. There was a bloody sword fight and a murderer with 
a gun, looking down at his victim’s corpse. There was a unicorn and 
a minotaur and a satyr and a fat angel woman with wings and lots 
of chubby babies in all colors. Downstairs—that is, from between 
the labial folds of her enormous vagina—the fertile matriarch 
 
7 The complex structure, the subject and the style of the work remind of 
the work of Georges Perec, Cabinet d’amateur, which is, not by chance, men-
tioned by Hustvedt (Hustvedt: 2014, 286). 
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popped out another city of little humanoids. (Hustvedt 2014: 314-
315) 
 
The plethora of worlds that the ‘real' Cavendish had set in her inner 
blazing world are recreated by Harry in an almost carnal body, full of 
her fluids, her genital apparatus, but also her imaginary parts and the 
instrument of work she would have used if she lived and wrote in 21st 
century. Hustvedt recalls also 17th century with the wonder of multiple 
and turning proportions and the most representative ‘mask' of the 
period, that of Gulliver, in his relation with the little Lilliputians. In 
doing so, Hustvedt is creating a pure feminist mother-daughter relation 
with Cavendish, the way Irigaray suggested to overturn the patriarchal 
scheme of voices. Recreating Margaret Cavendish’s body, Harry (and 
Hustvedt as well) gives her a new voice that speaks through the body, 
the mystery, the blood, and that by all this can perpetuate her generative 
skills, in a way and a duration different from that patriarchy had 
foreseen. Margaret Cavendish wasn’t able to give birth to any child 
through her physical body, but her paper body gave birth to a female 
offspring lasting four centuries. Siri Hustvedt (and Harriet Burden, as 
well) is now called to bequeath the same heritage. 
 
Maskings and masquerades 
The practice, or better the tactic of the masquerade is the first 
common feature between the two authors. Hustvedt herself claims: 
 
The duchess sometimes wore men’s clothes, vests and cavalier 
hats. She bowed rather than curtsied. She was a beardless 
astonishment, a confusion of roles. She staged herself as mask or 
masque. Cavalier hat off to you, Duchess. May its plumage wave. 
Cross-dressers run rampant in Cavendish. How else can a lady 
gallop into the world? How else can she be heard? She must become 
a man or she must leave this world or she must leave her body, her 
mean-born body, and blaze. The duchess is a dreamer. Her 




characters wield their contradictory words like banners. (Hustvedt 
2014: 221) 
 
The issue of masquerade is one of the fundamental questions of 
feminist visual studies, and of feminist film studies that, thanks to Mary 
Ann Doane, have recovered the issue from Irigaray's French feminism 
and from the psychoanalysis of Joan Riviere. 
At its origin, the masquerade was a very popular genre of public 
entertainment in the English court in the first half of the seventeenth 
century, and later even out of the court in the English theatre till the 
eighteenth century8. It was a peculiar form of mise en scene playing with 
the subversion of roles, even gender roles, especially appreciated by 
women. In twentieth-century film studies, scholars such as Mary Ann 
Doane have detected this kind of transvestitism as a particular means of 
disturbance. This female tactic is somehow linked to the question of 
mimicry. This is a question discussed in two different ways by Homi 
Bhabha, who defined it as an “ironic compromise” (Bhabha 1984), and 
by Luce Irigaray, who defined it as an interim strategy for dealing with 
the realm of the discourse (Irigaray 1977). Both the female and the black 
objects share a triple kind of gaze: that of a subject, that of an object, and 
that of a double character being aware both of his/her looking and the 
to-be-looked. 
Within this compromise the 'other' is recognized as a «subject of 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite» (Bhabha 1984: 127). On 
the other hand, the she-subject is a hysterical subject, staging the 
disbelief and the oppression, while exiting the censorship of the 'master' 
beholder (Irigaray 1977: 168). Donning the masks attributed by the 
dominant visual regime doesn’t mean, both for Bhabha and for Irigaray, 
 
8 For the history of Masquerade and its political importance see at least: 
David Bevington, Peter Holbrook (ed.), The Politics of the Stuart Court Masque, 
Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Francis Bacon, Of 
Masques and Triumphs, in id. Essays and New Atlantis, New York, W.J. Black, 
1942; Ben Jonson, Neptune’s Triumph For the Return of Albion, London, 1624; 
Stephen Orgel, The Illusion of Power: Political Theater in Renaissance, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1975. 
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simply accepting to be an object, rather to use the resulting partiality and 
the virtuality as a means of resistance, with no intention of harmonizing 
the differences. Under the mask of desiring gazes, objects do not stop to 
be looked at, but what is really looked at is the image already made by 
the observers. The real subject with all his or her peculiarities is (more 
or less) safe under this image and he/she is returning the gaze, even 
though the beholder doesn’t know it, or at least he or she is somewhere 
else. 
Although made similar by the same hidden phallocularcentric9 
gaze, mimicry and masquerade, as means of using this apparatus to 
unmask its own attempt to homologate the differences, differ in 
something. Irigaray defines the masquerade in a more doubtful way: 
«an alienated or false version of femininity arising from the woman’s 
awareness of the man’s desire for her to be his other, the masquerade 
permits woman to experience desire not in her own right but as the 
man’s desire situates her» (Irigaray 1977: 220). 
The ways in which both Cavendish and Hustvedt use the strategy 
of masking are peculiar. For Cavendish the masquerade was the way to 
make her body speak, a body that by no means used to behave as it was 
supposed to do: it was a mad (or neurotic) body and, moreover, a sterile 
one. She had no other chance than showing up that strangeness, in the 
most spectacular and unobvious way, in a kind of performance that 
opened up her own shy body in an unacceptable way. Joyce Devlin 
Mosher refers to her strategy as that of the female spectacle in which the 
power of dressing and the display of masks, more or less fitting the male 
 
9 Irigaray turns to Nietzsche and Derrida's critique of feminism and de-
cisively connects ocularcentrism to phallocentrism, tracing the origin of the 
concept of femininity as a lack in the old idealistic illusion of an eidetic reality. 
Since when the "perspective of truth" has forgotten the materiality and corpo-
rality of our vision the visual experience has taken root as a dialectic of the 
domain of those who look onto those who are looked at. But the philosophy 
of différance provides Irigaray with the means to combat "the blind spot of the 
old dream of symmetry", which has affected not only Freud but also Lacan's 
theories (Irigaray: 20) 




apparatus, serve her desire of self-realization. It is the precise aesthetics 
that shaped her personal life and her works as well. 
It is well known that Margaret Cavendish designed her physical 
presence as a structured demonstration of her elusive identity, described 
by her contemporaries under the simplified category of “bizarre and 
garish”10. From a less myopic point of view, we can nowadays see the 
design under this personal masquerade as an assumption of «the 
artificial in order to transcend it» (Mosher 2005: 3). In this case the 
artificial was the constructed fashion she produced for herself – with 
jewels, dressing and all kinds of accessories – and for her female 
characters, which had something more than the pure desire to be 
addressed by the gazes of everyone as a goal, for the crowd addressed 
their mask and not their self.  
There has been a long debate about the apparent discrepancy 
between her innate shyness and this kind of showing off, staged for 
example during the visit of the Duchess to the Royal Society. Lisa T. 
Sarasohn frames this visit within the consideration that age had of 
female writing: a queer phenomenon considered as unnatural and 
curious as the monstrous, the hermaphroditism, in short, the in-between 
(Sarasohn…). An undefined object Cavendish took advantage of, not 
only in order to manage it as a new subject, not yet enclosed within 
dominant categories, but also as a mirror reflecting the same 
spectacularity under which the Royal scientists disguised their activity, 
thus manipulating the audience. While being the first woman to enter 
the Royal Society sessions, Cavendish, who used to wear ultra-feminine 
clothing, decided to show herself in male attire and performed a parade 
with pageboys and maids accompanying her. This is a performance that 
we will soon see in one of her plays, acting like Irigaray supposes the 
woman to act within mimicry: laying the sexual nature bare, which at 
the same time prevented her self from being absorbed. In doing so 
 
10 This is the description of Margaret Cavendish visiting the Royal Society 
made by Samuel Pepys in his diaries, See The Diary of Samuel Pepys, A new and 
complete transcription edited by Robert Latham and William Matthews, 
London, G. Bell & Sons, 1970–83, vol. 8, pp. 243–244. 
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Cavendish reached a triple target: to make visible what was supposed 
to be and to stay invisible; to jam the theoretical machinery, which 
manages both this visibility and invisibility; to suspend the pretended 
truth which masks the univocal meanings this machinery produces 
(Irigaray 1977: 78). 
Far from being a passive observer of Boyle’s ‘spectacles’, since in 
this way his displayed experiments were defined by the society itself, 
Cavendish was converting the planes of representation. Diverting the 
gazes from the supposed spectacle to herself, she became the object of 
vision, rather than the spectator, but a specific kind of object, since the 
body addressed was not her true body, the one she refers to as a 
defective one, but a masked one, the blazing body of her empress/knight 
to be adored and worshiped.  
No longer a passive object or a controlled one, rather an object 
conscious of being looked at, she used and manipulated the whole 
system included in the general visual regime. She was not only 
conscious of the way in which the most acclaimed scientists were 
making science spectacular – i.e. an amusement rather than a profession 
–, but she was also very well acquainted with the whole visual society, 
which staged diverse sorts of bodies involving both the subjects 
displaying and the objects displayed.  
For what concerns Hustvedt the issue is quite different. Harry, in 
fact, does not show herself. She always remains hidden under her 
masks. However, her art never mimics that of her three accomplices, on 
the contrary they end up being very influenced by her art, by her 
thought, by herself in flesh and thought. The masks used by Harry 
weren’t fictional but real bodies of men, which in their very bodies 
became pieces of her art. Hustvedt makes her “Editor” explain very well 
in the introduction: «Each artist mask became for Burden a ‘poetized 
personality,’ a visual elaboration of a ‘hermaphroditic self,’ which 
cannot be said to belong to either her or to the mask, but to ‘a mingled 
reality created between them’» (Hustvedt: 2014, 2). 
 




A point of view of her own 
To summarize in a few words the common thought under the 
works of the two authors we could say that it stays in the research on 
the functioning of human perception, and above all of visual perception; 
of how it relates to knowledge, I would say in their case to 
understanding; how it becomes artistic creation and is transmitted 
through the use of art (be it literary or figurative) in the form of words 
or images, in a circle of learning and endless artistic enjoyment. At the 
centre of this experience lies the person, the subject, because there is no 
knowledge of any kind that is not subjective, which does not start from 
a particular point of view, from the images already perceived, stored, or 
only imagined, even by the neural history of the person who looks, who 
reads, who writes, who creates. 
Furthermore, both in the case of Margaret Cavendish and Siri 
Hustvedt, not only is knowledge subjective, it is even interior: we know 
through ourselves, projecting the 'matter' we are made of onto the 
external world and re-projecting in our interior what we perceive from 
the outside. Knowledge, we say today after Vittorio Gallese, is 
embodied. 
The reference to subjectivity is crucial, especially in the case of 
Cavendish, almost outrageous, for an age that was trying to achieve the 
objectivity of scientific observation through a mechanical look. It is the 
age of the birth of the experimental philosophy, of the academies, first 
of all the Royal Society, of the observations through microscope and 
telescope, through those optical devices that, as Hooke and Bacon had 
already indicated, would have allowed the «sincere hand and the 
faithful eye to examine and record things as they are» (Hooke), which 
opened the plurality of microscopic or telescopic worlds to human sight. 
From that moment the human eye pretended to be able to see, and 
therefore to know, everything that is not human-sized. At the same time 
the humankind ended up being a measure of the world, centre of the 
universe, the whole human world was discovered to be nothing but a 
grain of sand in an immense universe, and that grain was only one of 
the possible levels of reality. This mood led to the rediscovery of ancient 
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journeys to the moon and to the foundation of utopian. Thus, the age of 
scientific certainties gave birth to science fiction. On the other hand, 
what better way to know an unmeasurable unknown than imagination! 
Cavendish was particularly sensitive to the fascination of imagination, 
or fantasies, considered as a real means not only of knowledge, but of 
perception, since the direct perception was her purpose (Cavendish 
2012). 
If, from her point of view, the human vision is a process shared 
between eye and mind, then there must be a link between imagination 
and reason, a link that leads to the consideration of a finer perception, 
particularly suited to the female imagination. This conception makes the 
vision, and all other kinds of knowledge, work through three different 
mechanisms: immediate observation, rational abstraction and 
imaginative speculation. The first puts the validity of optical devices as 
scientific instruments at risk, turning them into instruments of visual 
pleasure, which could make us forget the medium, as usually happens, 
for example, with the denial of the body as a means. The second was one 
of the most debated issues of the time, when the power of reason was 
still operating under the disembodied process of the gaze, increasingly 
connected to an internal and superior eye. The third, finally, represented 
the most dangerous concept for the era of the Royal Society, since it 
showed up the need of a codification – first of all a linguistic and 
technical codification – for all that has to do with the process of 
knowledge and experimentation, a codification which cannot be free 
from imagination. 
The images of science excite, whether we like it or not, the 
imagination that, rather than refused, should be exploited to reach a 
larger part of the public. This is exactly the goal of Cavendish's works, 
such as The Blazing World which, not by chance, was the appendix of a 
treatise of experimental philosophy: 
 
If you wonder, that I join a work of Fancy to my serious 
Philosophical Contemplations; think not that it is out of a 
disparagement to Philosophy; or out of an opinion, as if this noble 
study were but a Fiction of the Mind; for though Philosophers may 




err in searching and enquiring after the Causes of Natural Effects, 
and many times embrace falsehoods for Truths; yet this doth not 
prove, that the Ground of Philosophy is merely Fiction, but the 
error proceeds from the different motions of Reason, which cause 
different Opinions in different parts […]. And this is the reason, 
why I added this Piece of Fancy to my Philosophical Observations, 
and joined them as two Worlds at the ends of their Poles; both for 
my own sake, to divert my studious thoughts, which I employed in 
the Contemplation thereof, and to delight the Reader with variety, 
which is always pleasing (Cavendish: 1994, 152-153) 
 
Cavendish considers the world made up of atoms that give shape 
not only to the outside world but also to mental processes, first of all that 
of the imagination (Cavendish 1994). Fantasy and imagination are, 
therefore, creative tools of knowledge through which the mind can learn 
from. Moreover, our knowledge is according to Cavendish, a knowledge 
of images, of eidola. Of course, our senses are the principal means by 
which we can come into contact with these images, but the imaginative 
vision brings them to light, being the mind and the forms made of the 
same atoms. 
Sensoriality is, therefore, limited and cannot lead us to a wider 
knowledge. Imagination, instead, makes us discover what could exist 
beyond these limits. How could we, otherwise, discover unimaginable 
things like the microcosm and the macrocosm, other worlds within ours, 
the atoms or the air? Imagination is not considered as a free movement 
of the mind, it belongs to the same materiality of the brain, it is not 
fantastic and therefore it is necessary to educate it both to natural 
philosophy and to poetry, the first orientates it to the forms of sense, the 
second let her recognize form and beauty. 
To this sensoriality/imagination pair, Hustvedt adds another 
element: memory, that is a complex process of definition of the present, 
of recreation (and not only reminder) of the past, of creation and 
imagination of the future. It is therefore made of the same substance as 
imagination, and of the very substance of artistic creation: 
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Memory and imagination partake the same mental process, they 
both are bound with emotion and often assume the form of 
narrative. Novel writing as well as any other form of artistic 
creativity stems from the same faculty that transmutes experience 
into the narratives we remember explicitly, but which are formed 
unconsciously (Gallese 2011: 196) 
 
Fiction, therefore, would be the re-elaboration of unconscious 
memories along with emotional elements (Hustvedt calls them “tones”) 
and their translation into a meaningful narrative: «Writing fiction is like 
remembering what never happened» (Hustvedt 2011: 187).  
As Hustvedt says, Margaret Cavendish was an «Anti-Cartesian, in 
the long run anti-atomist, anti-Hobbesian, […] a hard-bitten monist and 
a materialist who didn’t, couldn’t quite leave God out of it. Her ideas 
overlap with Leibniz’s». On the other side, Hustvedt's ideas on fiction 
and imagination can easily be included into the embodied simulation 
theory and even more specifically seem to fall into the theory of 
embodied liberated simulation. 
Quoting Gallese: «The body-mind systems are endowed with non-
introspective pre-rational processes (embodied simulation) that 
generate an experience of the physical and not only mental mind: 
intentions, emotions and motor sensations, and also experiences lived 
by other people even when narrated» (Gallese 2011: 197). These systems 
make our mind trigger physical reactions similar to those that would be 
activated if we were really subjected to the stimulus that we are reading, 
observing or imagining. Indeed, when we read, we watch a movie, we 
look at a picture, the concentration of our mind and our body (which at 
that moment is not engaged in any other activity) release an even more 
powerful bodily reaction than in a non-simulated situation (liberated 
simulation). 
From a neuroscientific perspective, therefore the clear separation 
between real and fictional, between real worlds and fictional worlds 
appears much less defined and much less clear than we have imagined 
for centuries. Thus «when the artist, through his imaginative creativity, 
gives life to a fictional world, it shares with the real one not only many 




of its aspects, but also many of its supporting neuronal processes» (ibid.: 
199). We would say, as Cavendish said, that the imaginary worlds are 
made of the same substance as the mind, and they do not reside 
anywhere but within us. 
According to Vittorio Gallese, Siri Hustvedt demonstrates that 
«neuroscience and psychoanalysis can converge when they deal with 
the world of fiction, as both see the body as the common playground for 
the imagination» (Gallese 2011: 200). 
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